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OTHER ANSWERS: SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
COERCED CONFESSION, AND CRIMINAL
TRIAL IN SCOTLAND*
PAuL HAERDIN, III t
Despite a common indebtedness to Anglo-Saxon legal tradition,
significant contrasts appear in the administration of criminal justice
in Scotland and the United States. While American rules of pro-
cedure and evidence have now had a long period of independent
development, Scotland, with its rugged indigenous institutions and
its historical and continuing flirtation with Roman law,' has resisted
slavish adherence to English legal procedure more successfully perhaps
than any other nation having close ties with England.'
Accordingly, at this time of perhaps unprecedented soul-searching
by the American legal profession concerning the administration of
* This Article was prepared, partly in Edinburgh, for the Comparative Study of
the Administration of Justice, established under the terms of a grant from the Ford
Foundation to Loyola University School of Law (Chicago). It is published here
with the consent of the Study, which reserves all rights.
t Professor of Law, Duke University. A.B. 1952, LL.B. 1954, Duke University.
Member, Alabama Bar.
The author is indebted to Mr. Ian Murray, Advocate, of Edinburgh, for valuable
assistance in the documentation of this article and to Mr. William Prosser, Advocate,
of Edinburgh, for useful services rendered during the period of preliminary research.
I SaniTr, SCOTLAND (11 THE BRITISH COMmoNWEALT--THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ITs LAWS AND CONSTITUTION) 3-24, 117-19 (1962) [hereinafter cited as SMITH];
STAIR SOCIETY, SoURCaEs AND LrrERATURE OF SCOTS LAW (1936). Sugden v. H.M.A.,
[1934] Just. Cas. 103 (Scot.), is an interesting twentieth-century case illustrating
the continuing influence of Roman law.
2 See de Funiak, The Legal System of Scotland, 38 TuL. L. REv. 91 (1963);
Sullivan, A Comparative Survey of Problems in Criminal Procedure, 6 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 380 (1961). "The divergence between Scottish and English law is probably
more pronounced in the field of criminal procedure than in any other." SmITH 207.
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criminal justice,3 I intend in this Article to examine certain evidence
rules and practices in Scottish criminal cases which should be of
interest to American lawyers.'
I. THE BASIC MACHINERY AND A WORD ABOUT PROSECUTORS
There are two forms of criminal procedure in Scotland, solemn
procedure followed in trials for serious crimes and summary procedure
resorted to when lesser offenses are charged.5 Our principal concern
will be solemn criminal procedure, in which action is commenced by
indictment, and trial is before judge and jury.
Two courts have jurisdiction in solemn procedure. The High
Court of Justiciary, which is both a trial court and the highest appellate
court in Scottish criminal cases, has jurisdiction to try all indictable
offenses. Although these same High Court judges (constituted as
the Court of Session) hear civil cases solely in Edinburgh, they try
criminal cases on circuit throughout Scotland.
The sheriff courts, which sit in every shire of Scotland, have
concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court over most, but not all,
indictable offenses. When jurisdiction is concurrent, the High Court
is likely to try more serious cases, as a sheriff has no authority to
impose any prison sentence longer than two years.
Although private prosecution is theoretically possible in Scotland,
practically every case is prosecuted by a public official.6 The Lord
Advocate, appointed by the Crown, has virtually unlimited power to
initiate and control criminal prosecutions throughout Scotland. In
the High Court he appears personally or operates through assistants
known as advocates depute. His representatives in the sheriff courts
3 In addition to the recent pioneering United States Supreme Court activity, see,
for example, the recently published COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAT
OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1964),
and the recently launched ABA study "looking toward the formulation of a code of
minimum standards of criminal justice in the United States." American Bus. News,
March 15, 1964, p. 4.
4 For an excellent treatise which contains an inclusive exposition of Scottish
criminal procedure, see RENTON & BROWN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACCORDING TO THE
LAW OF SCOTLAND (3d ed. 1956). Unfortunately, the book is out of print, and
personal copies are hard to acquire, even in Scotland.
5 The principal controlling statutes are the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act,
1887, 50 & 51 Vict., c. 35, in solemn procedure, and the Summary Jurisdiction (Scot-
land) Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 48, in summary proceedings. For general back-
ground on the two types of criminal procedure and on the courts and officials of
Scottish criminal justice, see PENTON & BROWN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1-13; SMITH
98-103, 207-08; Smith, A Scottish Survey, 1956 CRrM. L. REv. (Eng.) 104. This
brief discussion on the basic machinery of Scottish criminal justice is drawn from
these sources, and specific citations are omitted.
6 SMITH 207. A most interesting recent case in which the High Court refused
to authorize a private prosecution is McBain v. Crichton, [1961] Just. Cas. 25 (Scot.).
[Vol.l13:165
CRIMINAL TRIAL IN SCOTLAND
are called, undescriptively, procurators fiscal.7  Even summary prose-
cutions for minor infractions in the inferior courts are conducted by
public prosecutors, never by police officers, and the Scots pridefully
suggest that their system provides prosecution less highly partisan
than those systems that widely utilize either private or police
prosecution.
Of course, Scotland has no monopoly on the ideal of prosecutors
bound primarily to see that justice is done and only secondarily
interested in procuring convictions. Yet the author, after observing
criminal trials in the United States and in Scotland, reluctantly con-
cludes that the tradition is better implemented in practice by the
Scots.8
II. THE CROWN'S QUEST FOR EVIDENcE
If criminal justice is to be administered at all, the prosecution
must have reasonably efficacious machinery for gathering evidence,
but this evidence should be gathered with some respect for individual
dignity and freedom. Nothing is simpler than to elicit agreement on
that general statement and nothing more baffling than to apply it in
particular fact situations. In the areas of search and seizure and of
police interrogation, the Scottish experience is similar enough to the
American to be highly relevant and different enough to be informative.
A. Searches and Seizures
The early attitude of Scottish courts toward the admissibility of
illegally obtained evidence accorded with the American common-
law view. For example, in a 1933 case, Lord Morison said: "I think
it is quite immaterial whether the [evidence was] . . . obtained by
the regular procedure or not. . . . I do not see that the interest of
justice should be prejudiced because a police officer, through either
ignorance or negligence, failed to comply with the regulation." ' In
the United States, of course, this traditional view that official abuses
in obtaining evidence have no bearing on admissibility has given way,
laboriously but now almost completely, to a constitutional rule exclud-
ing evidence illegally obtained by federal or state officers."0 The
Scottish experience has been quite different.
7 The derivation of the name is set out in Sullivan, supra note 2, at 383 n.4.
S The statesmanship of Scottish prosecutors is related, I feel sure, to an overall
tradition of forensic moderation in Scotland, which I have commented upon in an
earlier article. Hardin, An American Lawyer Looks at Civil Jury Trial in Scotland,
111 U. P.,& L. REV. 739, 750-56 (1963).
9 Adair v. M'Garry, [1933] Just. Cas. 72, 91 (Scot.). See also LWvis, EVmIECE
IN ScoTLANm §292 (1925).
-o Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Two-and-a-half years after Lord Morison felt it was "im-
material"" how evidence came to be gathered, Lord Justice-Clerk
Aitchison, in admitting certain evidence over the objection that the
police had acted irregularly in gathering it, said: "An irregularity in
the obtaining of evidence does not necessarily make that evidence in-
admissible." " That one italicized word, fourteen years later, grew
into a new and important doctrine. In the case of Lawrie v. Muir,"
the keeper of a dairy was convicted of using bottles belonging to other
persons, a statutory offense. The evidence against her came from two
"inspectors" of a corporation formed for the purpose of restoring
milk bottles to their rightful owners. These inspectors had obtained
entry into the accused's premises by misrepresentation. The High
Court quashed the conviction. Lord Justice-General Cooper, writing
for the full bench, reviewed the earlier texts and cases holding that
it was no pertinent objection that an article or document had been
illegally seized, but then adopted "as a first approximation to the true
rule the statement of Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchson," quoted above.
Said Lord Cooper:
It remains to consider the implications of the word "nec-
essarily" . . . . Irregularities require to be excused, and
infringements of the formalities of the law in relation to these
matters are not lightly to be condoned. Whether any given
irregularity ought to be excused depends upon the nature
of the irregularity and the circumstances under which it was
committed. In particular, the case may bring into play the
discretionary principle of fairness to the accused.' 4
Most siguificantly, since the American rule of exclusion penalizes only
official misconduct, Lord Cooper found "sufficient to tilt the balance
against the prosecution" the circumstance that the "inspectors" who
found the milk bottles "were not police officers enjoying a large
residuum of common law discretionary powers, but the employees of
a limited company . . . whose only powers are derived from contracts
between the Board and certain milk producers and distributors, of
whom the appellant is not one." '- So the Scottish test of fairness to
the accused, in its very first application to a search and seizure case,
provided protection that the American rule of exclusion omits, pro-
tection against unreasonable searches by one's fellow private citizens."0
"1 Quotation accompanying note 9 supra.
[2 H.M.A. v. M'Guigan, [1936] Just. Cas. 16, 18 (Scot 1935). (Emphasis added.)
Is [1950] Just. Cas. 19 (Scot.).
14 Id. at 27.
3 Id. at 28.
16 But see Fairley v. Fishmongers of London, [1951] Just. Cas. 14 (Scot.), where
the court did not deem the conduct of private investigators sufficient to require ex-
clusion of evidence seized by them.
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Of course, by its very terms the Scottish rule offers somewhat less
protection against official misconduct than the American exclusionary
rule. Still the High Court has excluded evidence often enough 17 to
alarm at least one respected writer.'8
Scottish prosecutors may get a few "breaks" in the definition as
well as the consequences of illegal searches and seizures. The starting
point is the same: searches should be conducted pursuant to warrant
or as an incident of a lawful arrest. But several apparent laxities
exist in Scotland. In the first place, although arrest without warrant
is theoretically regarded as requiring explanation, 9 in practice arrest
with warrant is exceptional. 0 Thus "lawful" arrest may be a
broader practical concept in Scotland than in at least some American
states. Second, there is some indication in the Scottish cases that the
scope of search incident to arrest is broader than in the United States,
extending occasionally beyond the actual premises where the arrest
occurs.2 Finally, without any apparent authority in law, police con-
stables in Scotland are taught that in cases of great urgency they may
search premises without warrant and without an accompanying lawful
arrest.2 There is some feeling on the part of police officials that the
courts would sustain as lawful a search conducted in such circum-
stances. More likely, perhaps, the courts would characterize the
search as unlawful, but hold under the flexible fairness test that the
evidence could nonetheless be admitted. "Urgency" clearly is an
important factor in applying the fairness test.2'
B. Coerced Confessions and Police Interrogation
Let us supose a confession is taken under circumstances con-
cededly coercive and is obviously inadmissible. Suppose, further, that
17E.g., H.M.A. v. Turnbull, [1951] Just. Cas. 96 (Scot); McGovern v. H.M.A.,
[1950] Just Cas. 33 (Scot).
38 Gibb, Fair Play for the Criminal, 66 JuamR. RFv. 199 (1954).
'9 Shields v. Shearer, [1914] Sess. Gas. 33 (Scot. H.L.); RENTON & BROWN,
op. cit. stpra note 4, at 31.
20 1 was so informed by members of the instructional staff at Tulliallan Police
College in Scotland.2 1 See RENTON & BROWN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 33; SmrrH 217. The leading
case is H.M.A. v. M'Guigan, [1936] Just. Cas. 16, 18 (Scot 1935), in which the
accused was arrested away from his dwelling place and the court held that the police
were entitled approximately an hour later to search the dwelling, without a warrant
22 Conversation with members of instructional staff at Tulliallan Police College.
23 [T]here may be circumstances when the urgency of the situation is such
that recovery of the documents outwith the terms of the warrant may bejustified, since otherwise the documents might be lost or deliberately de-
stroyed. Again, it is a question of facts and circumstances in each case. It
therefore seems to me that, even if one were to accept Mr. Leslie's argument
that there was irregularity here, the two tests of fairness and urgency fall to
be applied.
H.M.A. v. M'Kay, [1961] Just Cas. 47, 50 (Scot).
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the police learn from the illegal confession the identity of an eye-
witness to the crime or the location of certain real or documentary
evidence. Is such evidence admissible though the confession itself
is not? The traditional view in the United States holds the evidence
admissible2 4 In fact under Dean Wigmore's theory of "confirmation
by subsequent facts," discovery of such evidence by means of the
tainted confession can remove the taint with the result that all ' or
part 2" of the confession will be received along with the discovered
facts themselves, or at the very minimum the evidence can be identified
to the jury as having been found as a consequence of the accused's
information.27 It was Wigmore's view that, "The principle upon
which a confession is treated as sometimes inadmissible is that under
certain conditions it becomes untrustworthy as testimony." " How-
ever, in America today this theory has been largely repudiated. In-
voluntary confessions are excluded
not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but be-
cause the methods used to extract them offend an underlying
principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is
an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system-a system in
which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently
and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge
against an accused out of his own mouth.29
Although the supreme court of California has, in dictum, recognized
that the admission of real evidence traced through leads from an ex-
torted confession offends this federal constitutional standard no less
than admission of the confession itself,"° the present status of the "fruits
of the poisonous tree" remains uncertain, 1 and one still searches in
vain for an authoritative holding absolutely excluding such evidence.
In the leading Scottish case of Chalmers v. H.M.A.,8" a youth of
sixteen, under suspicion of having committed a murder, made a state-
24 3 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 859 (3d ed. 1940).
2Id. § 856.
26 Id. § 857.
27 Id. §858.
28 d. §822.
29 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
30 People v. Ditson, 57 Cal. 2d 415, 439-40, 369 P.2d 714, 727, 20 Cal. Rptr. 165,
178 (1962) ; see 36 U. CoLo. L. REv. 275 (1964).
81 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Killough v.
United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962). It should be noted that these cases
deal with confessions obtained in violation of the McNabb rule rather than in violation
of a due process clause. Surely the Supreme Court will eventually hold that the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does apply in the case of confessions extracted
in violation of the Constitution.
82 [1954] Just. Cas. 66 (Scot.).
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ment at the police station under circumstances which would have called
for exclusion of the statement if offered at the trial. He then was
taken by the police to a cornfield where he showed them a purse belong-
ing to the murdered man. These latter facts were admitted in evidence.
The High Court, however, quashed the ensuing conviction, holding
that the actions of the accused in leading the police to the purse should
be regarded as the same transaction as the earlier improper interroga-
tion and that, just as the statement was inadmissible, so was the
evidence of these subsequent actions. Although there is at least an
argument in another Scottish case that, where a confession is rejected,
"the facts which came to light in consequence of it must be rejected
also," I the court in Chalmers did not hold that the purse itself was
inadmissible. It did, however, squarely disapprove linking the accused
to the purse by proof that he knew where it was and led the officers to it.
This suggests a possible middle ground between the Wigmore ortho-
doxy and the outright exclusion of evidence discovered because of
coerced confessions. It would be possible to admit the evidence but
exclude the fact that it was discovered in consequence of a statement
made by the accused. Thus, if, for example, police find the body of a
murdered man as the result of a coerced confession, the corpse will not
have to be suppressed, but the state will have to connect the corpse with
the defendant by some means other than by proof via his confession
that he knew the location of the body. This course obviously does not
remove all incentive to abusive questioning by the police, but even sup-
pression of the corpse, despite its high "cost" to the police process,
might not have that effect. 4
In separating the voluntary from the involuntary confession, the
pervasive problem is how the law should regard interrogation of sus-
pects and prisoners by police officials. Here there is unquestionably a
great divergence in Scottish and American theory. American courts
have accepted such questioning as "often indispensable to crime detec-
tion" 85 and as "a necessary and ethical procedure provided there is no
undue pressure and no deceit or overreaching." 3 6 The Scottish courts
seem absolutely to forbid police questioning of prisoners or even of
33 Manuel v. H.M.A., [1958] Just. Cas. 41, 47 (Scot.).
34The penalty of outright suppression would be especially harsh in light of the
fact that police "abuses" in confession cases can be "innocent" so long as the McNabb-
Mallory rule is imprecise, and so long as some police interrogation of suspects is
considered an indispensable and legitimate part of the investigation of crime. Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 (1961).
Id. at 571.
:
3 6 McCoRmick, EvmErcE § 116, at 239 (1954). Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), however, may seriously impair the future effectiveness of police interrogation
through its ruling that a person is entitled to counsel from the moment when the
investigation has begun to focus on him as a particular suspect.
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those on whom suspicion has fallen, 7 a doctrine apparently even stricter
than the Judges' Rules in England."
We must now determine whether the practical divergence is as
great as the theoretical one in the two countries. This involves ex-
ploring the Scottish theory in greater detail while attempting to dis-
cover the actual Scottish police routine.
At the stage of initial investigation, the Scottish police may ques-
tion whomever they please. Of course, they have no power to force
answers, but, if the person who ultimately comes under suspicion makes
an incriminating statement at this time, there is no ground for exclud-
ing it from evidence. 9 A problem lurks here. During this preliminary
questioning of several persons, suspicion may begin to focus on a par-
ticular individual. This will probably occur long before the police
could justify an arrest. When this time comes, may the police con-
tinue to interrogate? Theoretically there can be no interrogation of a
person on whom suspicion has centered; but when does one pass from
the status of an ordinary citizen cooperating with police officials to
that of a suspect immune from further interrogation? Police officials
in Edinburgh and at the Tulliallan Police College readily admit that
they question people beyond mere awakening suspicion-to a point at
which they are prepared to make arrests on specific charges and to
issue caution. If this is "dangerous from the viewpoint of admissibility
of evidence," 4 it is nevertheless considered legitimate police practice,
so long, at least, as the persons under interrogation are acting
voluntarily.
This brings us to the next step in investigation by questioning.
There seems to be in Scotland a fairly well established practice of
"inviting" persons to come to and remain at the police station while
under suspicion, although there has been no charge or arrest. Although
there is serious question of the legality of such detention,4' and con-
sequently of the admissibility of statements made even without interro-
gation under such circumstances,4" in every case rejecting statements
made under this "voluntary detention," the courts have been able to
point to such factors as the youth of the suspects, their extreme nervous-
ness, if not illness, and an overall atmosphere of tension."
37 Manuel v. H.M.A., [1958] Just. Cas. 41 (Scot.); Chalmers v. H.M.A., [1954]
Just. Cas. 66 (Scot.) ; Stark v. H.M.A., [1938] Just Cas. 170, 175 (Scot.).
3s SmrrH 211. The Judges' Rules are set out and discussed in McCoRmicK,
EviDENcE § 116 (1954).
39 Bell v. H.M.A., [1945] Just. Cas. 61 (Scot.); SmrrH 213.40 Id. at 214.
41 Chalmers v. H.M.A., [1954] Just. Cas. 66, 78 (Scot).
42 Smiri 213.
43H.M.A. v. Rigg, [1946] Just Cas. 1 (Scot. 1945); H.M.A. v. Aitken, [1926]
Just. Cas. 83 (Scot).
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Thus, at the two early stages of interrogating persons wherever
they are found and of "inviting" them down to the station for a chat,
the practical gulf between Scottish and American procedure may be
much smaller than the theoretical one.44
Once a suspect is finally arrested on a criminal charge, however,
the Scottish courts really crack down on police interrogation, and the
difference between Scottish and American practice is quite marked.
An arresting officer in Scotland is necessarily bound to inform
the prisoner of the charge against him and to caution him that any-
thing which he may say in answer to the charge will be taken down in
writing and may be used in evidence.45 After caution is given, it is
quite clear that any statement resulting from police interrogation, no
matter how mild, will be inadmissible.46 In one case, for example, one
police officer (constable) asked another officer in the hearing of the
accused, "Was there a razor among his possessions?" The prisoner
then made an incriminating statement. In holding that the statement
could not be admitted in evidence, the court suggested that the prisoner
might possibly have thought the policeman was addressing the ques-
tion to him. 7  Even an invitation to speak without any ensuing ques-
tioning whatever has been held to vitiate a confession.48
Obviously, no matter how strict courts are, police officials can on
occasion successfully utilize improper practices. For example, I received
a hint or two that "smart" officers interrogate prisoners but never turn
over to the prosecutor resulting statements, relying instead on guilty
pleas or on real evidence discovered as a result of the questioning. How-
ever, candid discussions in Scotland with several constables and advo-
cates indicate that the Scottish police do issue caution with nearly every
arrest and in general eschew the sort of interrogation of prisoners
accepted as normal in the United States.
Thus, Scottish criminal justice seems to function smoothly with-
out postarrest interrogation. On the other hand, the divergence in
Scotland between theory and practice with respect to prearrest inter-
rogation of suspects seems to lend some support to the argument often
made in the United States that prearrest interrogation is a vital and
44 The commandant of the police college expressed the view that this is an
area in which police officers necessarily exercise discretion, and he added that the
only solution is to recruit good men for police work so that they will use soundjudgment in exercising this discretion in the light of the general judicial disfavor
of police interrogation.
45 SMrrH 210. Of course, this still is not required in this country. See Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601 (1961). But see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964).4 6 Stark v. H.M.A., [1938] Just. Cas. 170 (Scot.); Wade v. Robertson, [1948]
Just. Cas. 117 (Scot.) (dictum).
47 H.M .A.v. Lieser, [1926] Just. Cas. 88 (Scot.).
48 Wade v. Robertson, [1948] Just. Cas. 117 (Scot).
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occasionally the only practicable means of investigating crimes. To
shield even known criminals from orderly and noncoercive police inter-
rogation may be a too-squeamish preference of individual freedom to
the legitimate needs of the administration of criminal justice. Perhaps
this is the lesson of Scottish practice in which well trained and gen-
erally decorous police constables, in the face of a general prohibition
against interrogation of suspects, do go out and talk to known burglars,
for example, and justify their actions, if necessary, by explaining with
straight faces that these persons are not suspects, but are merely ordi-
nary citizens being invited to assist in the investigation of crime.
III. DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL
Very probably, of all the countries in the world that fall more or
less within the English legal tradition, the United States has done
most to take the gamesmanship and surprise out of civil cases and
least to accomplish the same end in criminal practice. Distrust and
conservatism toward pretrial discovery in criminal cases linger here
despite persuasive argument that the dilemmas usually cited in justi-
fication are more apparent than real.49 In Scotland discovery in civil
cases lags well behind American practice, especially our practice under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." But in a Scottish criminal case,
the accused can know what to expect when he enters the dock and is
immeasurably better off, at least in that respect, than his counterpart
in the American federal courts and in most state courts.
In solemn procedure the Crown must give advance notice of all
witnesses whom it expects to call and of all real and documentary
evidence which it expects to "lead" at the trial. 1 In practice this is
done by attaching a list of witnesses and a list of "productions" to the
record copy of the indictment which is lodged in the court of trial."
If the accused wishes to see the documents and objects so listed, they
must be made conveniently available for his inspection. Furthermore,
the accused has the privilege of "precognoscing" (interviewing) all
4 9 Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALi. L. REv.
56 (1961). The helpful literature here is abundant. See, e.g., Fletcher, Pretrial
Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. Rzv. 293 (1960); Developments in
the Law--Discovery, 74 HAav. L. Rxv. 940, 1051-63 (1961). See also an excellent
new article, Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964
DurE L.J. 476 (1964).
5o Hardin, An American Lawyer Looks at Civil Jury Trial in Scotland, 111 U.
PA. L. REv. 739, 742 (1963).
51 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1887, 50 & 51 Vict c. 35, §§ 27, 35.
2The statute cited in note 51 supra did not state a time for the giving of the
required notice. The old practice was "due time." The invariable practice now is
as stated in the text. Letter From Mr. Ian Murray, Advocate, Edinburgh, to the
Author, Nov. 17, 1963.
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witnesses on the Crown list.58 No witness or production that is not
so listed can be produced by the Crown at the trial unless leave of the
court is obtained and supplementary written notice is given to the
accused not less than two days before trial.54
This is a bilateral discovery mechanism. If the accused wishes to
examine any witnesses or to put in any productions not included in
the Crown's lists, he must give written notice to the prosecutor at
least three days before the date on which the jury is sworn to try the
case against him.55 The Crown may then inspect the accused's produc-
tions and take precognitions of his witnesses. If the accused fails to
give this notice, but satisfies the court before a jury is sworn that this
failure stemmed from legitimate inability, or even reasonable mistake,"6
the court may allow the evidence, giving such remedy to the prosecutor
by adjournment or postponement as shall seem just.57 The accused may
make use of the witnesses and productions on the Crown lists without
notice of intent to do so.
The precognition device has one serious deficiency. A general
rule of Scottish law is that one may not prove extrinsically facts rele-
vant only to the issue of credibility.5" Cross-examination to discredit is
wide enough, but the cross-examiner must take the answer of the wit-
ness. By early Scottish law this was even true with respect to attack
by prior inconsistent statements. Since 1852, however, on proper
foundation laid, a prior inconsistent statement may be proved by ex-
trinsic evidence.r9 There is nothing in the relevant statute that would
suggest any exception for precognitions, and there is authority, at least
in civil cases, for the use of precognitions to prove prior inconsistent
statements.00 But a practice has grown up in modern times of not
using precognitions for this purpose.6 Thus, one of the greatest values
of pretrial discovery, the use of pretrial statements to measure the
credibility of testimony at trial, is lost. If a witness testifies directly
53 See H.M.A. v. Monson, 31 Sc. L.R. 289, 294 (Scot. High Ct. of Justiciary
1893).
54 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1921, 11 & 12 Geo. 5, c. 50, § 1.
55 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1887, 50 & 51 Vict c. 35, § 36.
56Lowson v. H.M.A., [1943] Just. Gas. 141 (Scot.).
57 1 saw a very harsh ruling on this point in one case. The accused sought per-
mission to call to the stand a witness who had been a co-accused until he "copped
a plea" at the trial. The judge would not permit the accused to call the man because
he had not been listed as a prospective witness before trial.
58 II DICKSON, EVIDENCE IN SCOTLAND § 1619 (1887). See also LEwis, EVIDENCE
nI SCOTLAND 134 (1925), discussing the exception to this rule for de recenti statements.
59 Evidence (Scotland) Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict c. 27, § 3.
60 Gilmour v. Hansen, [1920] Sess. Cas. 598 (Scot. 1st Div.) ; Shearer v. M'Laren,
[1922] Scots L.T.R. 158 (Scot. Outer House) (dictum).61 M'Neilie v. H.M.A., [1929] Just. Cas. 50 (Scot. 1928) ; Binnie v. Black, [1923]
Scots L.T.R. 98 (Scot. Outer House).
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contrary to his precognition and stubbornly persists through cross-
examination, the cross-examiner, with the precognition in his hands,
is helpless.
The arguments advanced in justification of this prohibition of
extrinsic impeachment by precognition are not convincing. It begs
the question entirely to say that such statements are made under "con-
fidential circumstances." 62 The argument that the length of precogni-
tions is apt to prevent a witness from accurately recalling what he said
previously I is applicable equally to all longer statements in any form
and should not be invoked only against precognitions. If the real
objection to precognitions is that they are not verbatim sworn state-
ments, but are rather the interviewer's narrative impressions of what
the witness said and therefore are not sufficiently reliable for fair use
in impeachment, 4 then the Scots need a statute providing for sworn or
at least verbatim statements at precognition, and further providing for
their introduction into evidence, on proper foundation laid, for im-
peachment purposes. The same statute might also provide for the
pretrial discovery of presently nondiscoverable precognitions taken by
the other side. 5
If the accused seeks to ground his defense on documents or other
items in the possession of the Crown or third parties, the courts are
likely to order production.6" This matter, however, is apparently not
well settled, and such an order for production would probably be made
only if the accused showed specifically "for what purpose and to what
end production of the . . . documents is required." 67 It is, then,
highly doubtful that accused persons can use this device for a general
"fishing" search through the Crown files.
At the instance of either party to a Scottish criminal case, the
trial judge will take the deposition of anyone who has information
relevant to the case and who appears to be dying. If the person dies,
this deposition may be introduced in evidence at the trial.68
Under the Scottish Criminal Procedure Act 69 the accused must
serve notice in advance of trial if he expects to assert a special defense.
62 M'Neilie v. H.M.A., supra note 61, at 53.
63Conversations with judges and lawyers in Edinburgh and Glasgow.
6 4 Binnie v. Black, [1923] Scots L.T.R. 98, 101 (Scot. Outer House).
65 Cf. Sheridan v. Peel, [1907] Sess. Cas. 577, 44 Sc. L.R. 407 (Scot. 1st Div.).
66 Downie v. H.M.A., [1952] Just. Cas. 37 (Scot.) (dictum).
67 Id. at 40.
68 H.M.A. v. Bell, [1834] Sess. Cas. 1179 (Scot. High Ct of Justiciary) ; H.M.A.
v. Petersen, [1871] Just. Cas. 557 (Scot 1874).
69 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1887, 50 & 51 Vict c. 35, § 36. The special
defenses were identified to me by advocates in Edinburgh as "well known." See Note,
Three Steps Backward, 1963 ScoTs L.T. 166, for suggestion that the list of special
defenses is now "closed," limited to the five specified in the text accompanying this note.
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The statute does not specify the defenses but is applied in practice to:
(1) alibi; (2) insanity at the time of the commission of the act; (3)
self-defense; (4) "impeachment"-that the crime was committed by
another named person; and (5) that the accused was asleep at the time
that the act was committed. While the statute is absolute in its terms,
leniency apparently is quite common, certainly where the defendant is
not represented by counsel.
Finally, if the prosecutor desires the court to consider (for pur-
poses of sentencing) any previous convictions of the accused, he must
serve with the indictment a description of any such convictions.7"
These will not be seen by the trial judge until after the jury verdict.71
Then, if the accused expects to object to proof of any such conviction
as not applying to him, or on any other ground, he must give prior
written notice of such intention to the Crown. These reciprocal pro-
visions probably save some quibbling in court.
The Scots hallow, as we do, the principle that no man is bound
to incriminate himself. In fact that is the underlying basis of the
Scottish rule excluding confessions unfairly obtained.72 This principle
has not been felt, however, to stand in the way of requiring
accused persons in criminal cases to serve advance notice of special
defenses which they expect to assert, witnesses whom they
expect to call, and documents and objects which they expect to
offer in evidence. Hopefully, this view may someday prevail in the
United States. 3 Since prosecutors presently enjoy a large advantage
in investigative resources and techniques, defendants surely have more
to gain than to lose by liberalized bilateral discovery provisions. Be-
sides, to say that one is being forced to incriminate himself when he
is required to disclose in advance of trial theories and evidence which
he has decided to offer at trial in his own exoneration seems to make
of the self-incrimination privilege a fetish rather than a sensible
humanitarian doctrine.
IV. TRIAL
A. Selecting the Jury
The sacred American voir dire examination of prospective jurors
is unknown to the Scots. 4 Although such matters as insanity, relation-
70 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 94, § 39(b).
71 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 94, § 39(e).
72 Manuel v. H.M.A., [1958] Just. Cas. 41, 48 (Scot.).
73 Louisell, Crimital Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REv.
56, 87-90 (1961).
74 Hardin, supra note 50, at 745.
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ship to a party, or enmity constitute cause for challenge, 75 the jury list
must somehow be investigated for these things before balloting of the
jury begins. 76  As a consequence, in practically every case only
peremptory challenges are exercised,77 and, usually, the Crown foregoes
challenges altogether. 78
B. Evidence
Since all cases tried in solemn procedure are tried to a jury, the
rules of evidence play an important role in Scottish criminal practice.
However, more important perhaps than any difference in American
and Scottish rules is a striking difference in practice. My observation
of both civil and criminal trials in Scotland convinced me that Scottish
advocates have a tradition of unusual restraint in objecting to evidence
led by their opponents. I have dealt with that tradition at some length
previously in this Review, 79 and I merely mention it again here to
serve notice that evidence practice in Scotland is ofttimes a great deal
more liberal than evidence rules.
But some of the Scottish rules of evidence do differ importantly
from American law. I have previously commented, for example, on
the Scottish exception to the hearsay rule for all relevant statements
of deceased persons, on the wide scope of cross-examination in Scot-
tish trials, on the rule (important in criminal cases) admitting de
recenti statements, and on the free admissibility in negligence cases
of evidence of postaccident safety measures.8 0 I should like here to
present some other striking Scottish rules of evidence, the first hope-
fully of general interest, the other four very important in criminal cases.
1. Best Evidence Rule
Evidence teachers who year after year try to disabuse their
students of the notion that there is in America a rule of general applica-
tion requiring litigants to use the best evidence available,"' will be
7 5 RENTON & BROWN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF SCOTLAND
116 (3d ed. 1956). This is mainly a matter of unreported practice.
76 A list of prospective jurors is available to the accused from the date on which
the indictment is served. Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1887, 50 & 51 Vict.,
c. 35, § 38.
77 The Crown has five challenges, and each accused has five.
7 8 RENTON & BROWN, op. cit. supra note 75, at 116. This is largely a matter of
unreported practice.
79 Hardin, supra note 50, at 750-55.
sod. at 746-50.
8 1 McCormick has an excellent brief discussion of the history of the best evidence
principle, concluding with the consensus of modern scholars that the only rule that
properly goes by that name today is the rule requiring the production of original
writings in order to prove their contents. McCoRmiCK, EVIDENCE § 195 (1954).
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interested to learn that such a rule is well recognized in Scotland.'3
There one must adduce, if possible, eyewitnesses of the accidents and
crimes, persons who made statements sought to be proved at trial, the
original of documents to which reference is made, and the very chattels
and objects when some quality about them is in dispute. Only if these
items of "best evidence" are shown to be unavailable can a party offer
secondary evidence. It follows that the hearsay rule in Scotland is
but an application of the best evidence rule, and such an interpretation
would seem to augur admissibility of items which American courts
would exclude. If hearsay evidence is excluded because it is not
usually the best evidence, surely it ought to be admitted when it is
shown to be better than anything else at hand. Thus the Scots not
surprisingly admit all relevant statements of deceased persons in
Scottish trials.
I cannot tell just how much difference the Scottish best evidence
rule makes in other respects. Possibly not much. American lawyers,
as a matter of trial tactics, try to produce the best (most persuasive)
evidence and very probably resort to secondary material only under
circumstances which would lead Scottish courts to permit secondary
evidence on the theory that the best evidence cannot practicably be
adduced. For example, in civil cases Scottish courts do not carry the
best evidence principle so far as to require one who sues for damage
to his auto to postpone repairs and bring the damaged vehicle before
the jury.13
2. Impeachment of Witnesses
The most important difference between Scottish and American
rules governing attacks on the credibility of witnesses is the Scots'
82The rule has been exemplified by stating that, "where facts may competently
be proved in different ways the means most likely to carry conviction is to be pre-
ferred." LEwis, EvmiENcE IN SCOTLAND 256 (1925). And cases actually fail on
evidential grounds when a party, having the "best" evidence available, fails to bring it.
E.g., Gamage v. Charlesworth's Trustees, [1910] Sess. Cas. 257, [1910] Scots L.T.R.
11 (Scot. 1st Div. 1909).
83 This seems to be the practice, and authority is difficult. But since in such
a civil action one is required to minimize loss, the defender cannot object very
easily to a car being repaired as early as possible. Generally photographs or
plans will be accepted.
In criminal cases the matter is a little different. Corpses are not brought
in for murder trials, but on the whole the courts are much more punctilious
to see that productions, rather than evidence of these, are brought. Thus in
a poaching case I had, 40-odd salmon were kept in deep freeze for three months
to be produced at the trial. See Paterson v. H.M.A., [1901] Sess. Gas. 7
(Scot. High Ct. of Judiciary), which suggests that failure to let the jury
see an important production may be a ground for quashing a conviction.
Letter From Mr. Ian Murray, Advocate, Edinburgh, to the Author, Nov. 17, 1963.
84 This term is not used by the Scots to describe attacks on the credibility of
witnesses. "Impeachnient" to them is a special defense under which the accused in
a criminal case suggests that another named person committed the crime. See text
accompanying note 69 srtpra.
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aforementioned prohibition 5 of impeachment by extrinsic evidence.
To illustrate how far this rule goes, suppose that defense counsel asks
a Crown witness on cross-examination whether or not he has ever
been convicted of perjury. The witness is required to answer, but,
if he denies such a previous conviction, the matter is at an end, even
if counsel has official records available showing the conviction. 6
Surely this is giving too much importance to trial efficiency and too
little importance to weighing the credibility of witnesses.
Another aspect of Scottish practice relating to credibility is more
sensible. The accused in a criminal case may not be asked about
prior convictions of crimes solely because he takes the stand to testify
in his own behalf.8" This salutary rule has found favor, of course,
with the draftsmen of the Uniform Rules of Evidence in this
country."8
3. Character Evidence
In common with the United Kingdom and other British Common-
wealth countries, Scotland has a character evidence rule which does
not appear in American law. The accused "opens the door" to a
showing by the Crown that he is a person of bad character if "the
nature or conduct of the defense is such as to involve imputations on
the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution." '9
In Scotland the rule is interpreted more narrowly in favor of the
accused than in England. The accused is permitted to attack Crown
witnesses' character to the extent that this bears reasonable relation-
ship to his defense, without opening the door to having his own
character impugned. For example, one case involved the appearance
of a police constable as a witness for the Crown in an assault case.
The accused entered a plea of self-defense and was permitted to intro-
duce evidence that the constable was intoxicated at the time in question.
This did not open the door to attack on the accused's character, al-
though the case would have been different if, for example, the attack on
the constable had taken the more general form of an accusation that he
was a drunkard."°
Another interesting feature of character evidence in Scotland is
the manner of proving it. The Scots do not share our rather un-
85 See text accompanying notes 58-65 supra.
86 11 DICKSON, EVIDENCE IN SCOTLAND § 1619 (1887).
87 Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, § 1 (f).
8 8 UNIFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 21.
89 Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36, § 1 (f) (ii).
90 O'Hara v. H.M.A., [1948] Just. Cas. 90 (Scot.). See also H.M.A. v. Deigham,
[1961] Scots L.T.R. 38 (Sheriff Ct.). That an attack such as was made in the
O'Hara case would open the door in the English courts is a fair inference from the
case of R v. Jenkins, 31 Crim. App. R. 1 (Eng. 1945), and authorities cited therein.
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accountable preference for reputation evidence, but seem to accept
rather freely the opinions of persons who know the character trait
under inquiryf'
4. Self-Incrimination Privilege
The privilege against self-incrimination in Scottish law is di-
rected against testimonial compulsion. 2  When the courts are dealing
with such matters as having the accused speak for voice identification,
having him reenact a crime, extracting body fluids, or anything else
"physical," the tendency is to think in terms of fair play and, if the
evidence is excluded, to say simply that the evidence was "improperly"
obtainedV3 Limitation of the self-incrimination privilege to pro-
hibiting testimonial compulsion has been a popular American view,
although broader applications of the privilege have been made from
time to time. 4
The accused's failure to give evidence in his own behalf must not
be made the subject of comment by the prosecutor in Scotland, and
violation of this rule probably would vitiate a jury conviction. 5  On
the other hand the judge is entitled to draw the attention of the
jury to this failure to testify,96 although such comment should be
made with restraint and should in no case be emphasized or re-
iterated.97 Perhaps this judicial power to suggest the unfavorable
inference of a consciousness of guilt is not too harsh in a country
where the accused may not be cross-examined about prior convictions
merely because he takes the witness stand."' As a matter of practice,
Scottish judges apparently do not usually call attention to the accused's
failure to testify except to caution the jury not to draw any un-
favorable inference from that failure.
911 observed this in several trials and was told by Scottish lawyers that this is
the accepted means of proving character.9 2
"Testimonial compulsion' is Dean Wigmore's phrase. 8 WiGmoRE, EvmENCE
§ 2263 (McNaughton rev. 1961).93 E.g., in M'Govern v. H.M.A., [1950] Just. Cas. 33 (Scot.), the owner of a
bicycle, which had been found by police near the scene of a "safe-cracking," stated
to the police that the bicycle had been stolen from him and agreed to visit the station
in order to identify it. The police began to suspect that he was concerned in the
crime and, without his permission, took scrapings from his fingernails. Later he
was charged and arrested, and at his subsequent trial evidence was led that the scrap-
ings from his nails showed traces of an explosive like that which had been used to
blow open the safe. He was convicted, but the High Court quashed, holding merely
that the evidence "was improperly obtained," and never mentioning the privilege
against self-incrimination.9 4 McCoRMICK, EvINxcE § 126 (1954).
95 Two summary procedure nonjury cases stand for the proposition that violation
will not automatically result in reversal. Ross v. Boyd, [1903] Sess. Cas. 64 (Scot.
High Ct. of Judiciary); M'Attee v. Hogg, [1903] Sess. Cas. 67 (Scot. High Ct. of
Judiciary). But the consensus among advocates with whom I spoke was that the
Crown could not expect the same leniency on appeal from a jury verdict.9 6 Brown v. MacPherson, [1918] Just. Cas. 3 (Scot.).
97 Scott v. H.M.A., [1946] Just. Cas. 90 (Scot.).98 See text accompanying note 87 mepra.
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5. Corroboration
Traffic wardens in Edinburgh work in pairs. This seems to be
essential if convictions are to be had for such serious offenses as over-
time parking, because of the important and unique Scottish doctrine
of corroboration. In the leading case of Morton v. H.M.A.," the
High Court stated that, "[B]y the law of Scotland, no person can be
convicted of a crime or a statutory offence, except where the Legisla-
ture otherwise directs, unless there is evidence of at least two witnesses
implicating the person accused with the commission of the crime or
offence with which he is charged." 100
The fair import of that language seems to be that the doctrine's
central application is to the identification of the accused as the per-
petrator of the offense. Yet Lord Justice-General Cooper seems to have
had a different impression in the later case of Bisset v. Anderson.'
The charge in that case was that the accused was the owner of a private
motor vehicle which had commercial petrol in its tank. A single
analyst spoke to the fact that the petrol taken from the tank was com-
mercial petrol. In his opinion, holding that the testimony of two
analysts was necessary, Lord Cooper set out the above quotation from
the Morton case and added: "[I] n other words the evidence of a single
witness, however credible, is insufficient at common law to establish
the truth of any essential fact required for a criminal conviction." 102
Because of the great influence of Lord Cooper's opinion, the require-
ment of corroboration in Scottish criminal cases seemed for a time to
apply not only to proof that the accused perpetrated the crime, but also
to proof of every element of the crime.
The recent case of Gillespie v. Macmillan'0 o may have altered the
interpretation. There, the driver of an automobile was convicted of
speeding. Proof of the speed of the car depended on the evidence of
two police constables who had been stationed with stop watches, one at
either end of a measured distance. The constable at the entrance
started his watch as the car entered the measured distance, and the con-
stable at the exit started his watch as the car emerged. The accused
was stopped farther along the road by a third constable. The watches
were stopped simultaneously in the presence of the accused, and the
difference in time was noted. From this it was calculated that the
99 [1938] Just. Cas. 50 (Scot.).
1O Id. at 55.
101 Bisset v. Anderson, [1949] Just. Cas. 106 (Scot.).
102 Id. at 110. (Emphasis added.)
lo3 [1957] Just. Cas. 31 (Scot.).
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speed limit had been exceeded. Sustaining the conviction, the High
Court held that, although two witnesses were required to identify the
accused, the evidence of a single credible witness to each fact in a
chain of circumstantial evidence was sufficient in law to establish the
offense. Thus, it was competent for the one constable to time the
entrance into the measured distance and for the second to time the exit
therefrom, although neither could corroborate the other's testimony,
except with respect to the identity of the driver of the car.
The Gillespie case has been vigorously criticized as stating a "new
theory" 104 of corroboration and as being "contrary to the genius of
the criminal law of Scotland." However, the leading authority on
Scots Law seems unruffled by the case and appears to have accommo-
dated his definition of corroboration to it. Perhaps all that is left of
the doctrine is the rule, as he states it, "that the material elements in
the prosecutor's case which identify the accused with the commission
of the crime must be established by the testimony of two credible
witnesses." 106
The corroboration rule is relaxed even as to identification in cases
where a series of similar crimes, "interrelated by character, circum-
stance, and time," 107 justifies the inference that the accused pursued a
set pattern of criminal conduct. In such cases the testimony of single
credible witnesses to each crime in the series may be accepted as
mutual corroboration. The leading early cases involved similar sexual
assaults on young girls,' but the rule has been applied in more recent
cases to razor slashings (six separate assaults) 109 and attempts to bribe
football players (two bribery attempts set a sufficient pattern to invoke
the rule).110
Even as partially eroded by these "pattern" cases, the Scottish
rule requiring testimony of two witnesses to identify persons accused
of crime is an important one. It seems salutary that no person should
be convicted of serious crime on the testimony of a single witness.
And the onus on the prosecution is not as great as one might at first
suppose. In a stabbing case, for example, the Crown need not pro-
duce two eyewitnesses to the occurrence itself. The corroboration
requirement is met if two or more witnesses testify to incriminating
circumstances such as the accused's flight from the scene, blood on his
104 Wilson, The Logic of Corroboration, 76 ScoT. L. REv. 101 (1960).
105 Corroboration of Evidence in Scottish Criminal Law, 1958 ScoTs L.T. 137, 141.
106 SMrri 235.
o7 Id. at 237.
108 Burgh v. H.M.A., [1944] Just. Cas. 77 (Scot.); Moorov v. H.M.A., [1930]
Just. Cas. 68 (Scot.).
109 H.M.A. v. M'Quade, [1951] Just. Cas. 143 (Scot.).
110 M'Cudden v. H.M.A., [1952] Just. Cas. 86 (Scot).
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clothes, bloody knife in his possession, or perhaps his incriminating
statements."' On the other hand, the corroboration requirement seems
inefficient when applied to minor statutory offenses. Poaching acts
dispense with corroboration, since "gamekeepers are not normally
escorted by credible witnesses." 11 Perhaps an outsider may suggest
that a similar dispensing with the corroboration requirement in traffic
offenses could reduce the public payroll without too great a sacrifice
of justice.
C. Instructions and Verdict
1. Burden of Proof
The presumption of innocence and the burden on the prosecution
to prove each element of a case beyond a reasonable doubt are key-
stones of Scottish criminal justice, as they are of English and Ameri-
can." 3 On the other hand, under Scots law the burden rests upon the
accused to prove so-called affirmative defenses "on a balance of prob-
abilities." " This latter rule seems to me an unfortunate one, and
yet, apparently, more and more American jurisdictions are embracing
it.1 15  In its every application it is likely to confuse the jury, and in
many cases, if not most, it requires the jury to perform a feat logically
impossible. It is utter nonsense to instruct a jury that the prosecution
has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused assaulted the
complaining witness, and then to say that the accused, having alleged
that he was elsewhere at the time, has to prove his absence by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence in order to escape conviction. If the first
half of the instruction means anything at all, it means that the accused
need only raise a reasonable doubt as to his whereabouts, a far different
requirement from persuading the tribunal that he was more probably
elsewhere than at the scene of the alleged crime. The Scottish courts,
while never admitting that these rules are incompatible, do seem to add
tortuous instructions that enable juries to use the accused's evidence
111 See Morton v. H.M.A., [1938] Just. Cas. 50, 52 (Scot.).
112 SMrrIH 235 n.19.
113 H.M.A. v. Mitchell, [1951] Just. Cas. 53 (Scot).
114 Ibid.; Dickson v. H.M.A., [1950] Just. Cas. 1 (Scot.); H.M.A. v. Braithwaite,
[1945] Just. Cas. 55 (Scot.).
115 1y what has been said to be the majority American view, defendants have no
burden of persuasion with respect to "affirmative" defenses, although they well might
have the burden of going forward with some evidence of, say, alibi or self-defense,
in order to force the prosecution specifically to negative these allegations. Yet one
wonders whether this can truly be said to be the majority view today. See 9 WIG-
MORE, EvIDENCE §§ 2501, 2512 (3d ed. 1940), and compare the materials in the hard-
bound volume with the recent cases cited in the pocket supplements. See also 49
IowA L. REv. 590 (1964) ; 24 MD. L. Rxv. 78 (1964).
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to find a reasonable doubt, even though it is too flimsy to persuade
on a balance of probabilities.""
2. Comment
The Scots have not taken from the trial judge his privilege of
commenting upon the evidence and upon the credibility of witnesses.
Although a conviction may be quashed if the judge does not "fairly
put the defence case to the jury," 117 or if he fails to caution the jury
that they are masters of the facts," 8 the judges do not hesitate to ex-
press their opinions and to suggest inferences to the jury. In one case
which I observed, eight co-defendants were charged on a complicated,
multiple-count indictment. The jury had to deal separately with each
accused person as to each count-a difficult task. The court dealt at
length in its charge with the case against one man, whom we shall
call E. He said two or three times that he thought it "singular" that
the testimony of the four constables was not well supported by civilian
witnesses with respect to E's participation in the crime. At least twice
he said, "I expect, ladies and gentlemen, that the case of the accused,
E, will cause you some anxiety." "Some anxiety" seemed to me and
to the jury, who acquitted," 9 to equate pretty well with reasonable
doubt. When the trial judge later saw the record of E's prior con-
victions, he stated to me that he was afraid that he had led the jury
to the wrong verdict in E's case, indicating that he shared my view
that his comment had been decisive. Another matter disturbed me
about this case. This particular judge was one who customarily was
careful to use his comment power to favor rather than condemn accused
persons. But his favorable comment about the accuseds, A, C, and E,
omitted in the cases of the other five accuseds, pretty well damned the
latter, or so it seemed to me.
3. Verdict
Two features about jury verdict in Scottish criminal cases present
sharp contrasts to American practice. First, a simple majority verdict
is sufficient to convict or acquit in Scotland. 20 There are fifteen
116 Dickson v. H.M.A., [1950] Just. Cas. 1 (Scot); Lennie v. H.M.A., [1946]
Just. Cas. 79 (Scot.).
117 Scott v. H.M.A., [1946] Just. Cas. 90, 96 (Scot.).
118 RENTO & BROWN, op. cit. supra note 75, at 152.
19 The verdict, actually, was "not proven." See discussion of that verdict form,
p. 186 infra.
120 1RENTON & BROWN, op. cit. supra note 75, at 123.
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jurors,12 ' and eight votes will convict of even the most serious crime. 122
Couple that fact with the practice of free judicial comment on the evi-
dence, and the jury appears far less important in Scotland than in the
United States.
The second contrast is that Scottish juries choose between three
possible verdicts: guilty, not guilty, and not proven (pronounced
pr6' yen). The retention of the not proven verdict is a matter of con-
tinuing debate. 3  Its legal effect is clear enough-the accused is
acquitted. What it means, however, in terms of the jury's attitude is
less clear. Whether because they feel that juries understand the matter,
or because they do not know how to help them understand it, trial
judges in Scotland do not instruct juries on any distinction between
the not guilty and not proven verdicts. 1' Left, thus, to their own
ingenuity, who knows what state of mind prompts juries to return
verdicts of not proven? Perhaps the most logical inference from such
a verdict is that the jury suspects that the accused might be guilty, but
feels that the Crown has not proven its case by the requisite doubt-free
standard. If, but for that form, some of these persons would be found
guilty, the form provides a valuable safeguard against the ignoring of
the reasonable doubt standard and should be retained in Scotland and
perhaps adopted elsewhere. If, however, all or practically all of the
not proven cases would become not guilty cases if the not proven form
were abolished, then it should be. For, if it is a mere redundancy,
it is far from a harmless one. An accused person whose presumption
of innocence theoretically has not been overcome is stigmatized to a
certain extent, even as he is set free. Furthermore, while this may not
provoke as much sympathy, the not proven verdict also stigmatizes the
prosecution by implying a certain lack of assiduousness. On the whole
it seems to me undesirable to attempt to erect in criminal cases any
sort of middle ground between guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and
not guilty.
121 Provision is made for the continuation of trial despite illness or other incapacity
of as many as three.
122 It still takes eight votes, even if illness or other cause removes one, two, or
three jurors from the original panel. Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act, 1933,
23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 41, § 19.
123 MacLean, Not Proven Verdicts, 75 Scor. L. REv. 21 (1959); Letter From
Ian Murray, Advocate, Edinburgh, to the Author, Nov. 17, 1963.
124 A fair example of a complete charge on the matter is the following: "That
leaves me nothing more to do, members of the jury, than just to tell you what the
possible verdicts are. Your first question is: Has the Crown proved beyond reason-
able doubt that the accused killed the deceased? If you do not think the Crown has
done so, then your verdict is not guilty or not proven." H.M.A. v. Mitchell, [1951]
Just. Cas. 53, 55 (Scot.).
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